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This paper discuss the rebirth of trust studies in recent years, especially in the field of 
political attitudes and opinions. The case study presented try to explore the relationship 
between electoral behaviour and political orientations, regarding the people‟s views 
about the role of state, market and „third sector‟ and application of law or social self-
regulation. We found prevailing statists and liberal orientations, but also a „concealed‟ 
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1. Introduction: The Rebirth of the Trust Studies 
 
For decades the trust concept was a silent partner of the sociological endeavor. 
Forgotten by Encyclopaedias, seldom discussed directly by prominent authors, “trust” 
remained merely a way of approaching the hobbesian problem and elaborate on the 
causes of solidarity, cooperation and social order. Beginning in the eighties, however, 
the concept has been revamped by a plethora of new approaches concerned with the role 
of trust in cultural and social capital (Pendenza, 2000; Coleman, 1988); social 
networking (Granovetter, 1985); political action (Dunn, 1988); dynamics of 
organizations (Kramer and Tyler, 1996; Lazaric and Lorenz, 1998; Dasgupta, 1988); 
relations between patrons and clients (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984); or even criminal 
organizations (Gambetta, 1992). Some go as far as claiming that trust is the most 
important asset when it comes to explain the reasons behind the development success of 
some countries and the ongoing failures of others (Fukuyama, 1995). Trust can also be 
seen as a proto moral element capable of economizing on transaction and authority costs 
and contracts, thus leading to organizational solutions close to what is generally known 
as quasi markets or quasi organizations (Landa, 1994). 
At the same time, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and 
economists alike multiplied their efforts and tried to build-up a general theory of trust. 
Despite some important contributions, the concept remains fuzzy and it is not difficult 
to find it applied in completely different senses. Bernoux and Servet (1997),   Gambetta 
                                               
# This paper results from the research project “Trust Society: the Social Construction of Trust in 
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(1988), Hardin (2004), M.A.U.S.S (1994); and Thuderoz et al. (1999) offer a collection 
of papers that present the wide spectrum of perspectives currently in use to define trust, 
mistrust and distrust.  Barber (1983), Eisenstadt (1995), Giddens (1990), Lewis and 
Weigert (1985), Luhman (1979), Misztal (1996), Seligman (1997), Sztompka (1999) or 
Williamson (1993) can be considered the major contributors to the theoretical advances 
of trust theory today. Despite their theoretical differences, if we search for a common 
denominator among these contributions, we‟ll be able to find some important elements: 
the relational dimension of the concept and the intrinsic vulnerability of the truster; the 
risk situation permeating the social encounter; the salience of the expert systems in the 
build up of confidence environments; the power dynamics and the costs created by the 
absence of trust.   
 
 
2. Three Approaches to Trust and a Sensitizing Concept 
 
Despite the huge number of trust definitions currently in use in Political Science, 
Sociology and Economics, we can limit them to three basic types: rational choice 
models, normative frameworks and relational and interactive constructions. The former 
is very close to the theorizing of the economical mainstream, claiming that both the 
truster and the trusted will act, in such a way as to maximise their utilities and self 
interest (cf. Brennan, 1998). They will decide to trust or not to trust after a very careful 
and thorough calculation of the probable outcome of each option. Information and the 
evaluation of the probabilities are central to their endeavour. Normative approaches tend 
to centre their reasoning on socialization and the generalization of sets of moral rules, 
leading to the build-up of a clear-cut system of expectations. Internalization of rules and 
pro social dispositions are central to this approach. Finally, the relational models are 
based on the idea that trust is a contingent construction embedded in webs of mutable 
social relations. Trust is socially (re)constructed in an interactive context.  
As it happens often with rational choice models, Hardin (1993, 1996, 1998, 
1999) has been able to advance a very elegant and simple definition of trust, making it 
an invaluable resource for the conduction of empirical research.  Hardin argues that we 
should view trust as nothing more than „encapsulated self interest‟. Trusting others is 
not a bet or a blind leap of faith, but a deliberative consequence of believing that they 
have a strong interest in taking my own interests into consideration. The encapsulation 
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comes from the fact that the fulfilment of someone‟s objectives is strictly dependent on 
the articulation with others. Trust results from the evaluation of the available 
information that we deem to be reliable and consistent and is the product of a cognitive 
calculation of some sort of subjective probability that we attribute to different outcomes. 
The truster knows that he needs the others if he wants to attain his objectives, but he 
also calculates whether the trusted have some sort of interest in aligning themselves 
with him. Trusting becomes a cognitive choice framed by risk. The more information I 
have on a particular individual, the lower the risk associated with trusting.  
In deep contrast with this definition we have some authors (Uslaner, 2002) that 
argue that trust is much more a generalised attitude towards others than the product of 
rational calculation by self-interested individuals. Uslaner advances a moral conception 
of trust, defined not by interactions (repeated or not) or reputation, but rather by a 
dispositional or attitudinal type of action guide.   Trust is „a moral value that reflects an 
optimistic world view and helps explain why people reach out to others in their 
communities who may be different from (and less fortunate than) themselves‟ (Uslaner 
2002: 16). The „optimism‟ in Uslaner‟s definition can easily be presented by a rational-
choice author as nothing more than a leap of faith or as a mere expression of the risky 
nature of all trust relations. Anyway, the presentation of this moral side of trust helps to 
explain that trust may well act as a substitute for honor, or friendship in cosmopolitan 
societies, which live beyond the direct and straightforward control of traditional 
communities. At this level, trust works not only as a lubricant of social systems or as a 
„Pagani mechanism‟, but also as an „as if‟ protocol, meaning that in the presence of 
risky situations, trust creates semi certainties and semi assurances that facilitate 
everyday life. Acting out of a sense of trust can induce reciprocation by the others, thus 
generalizing this disposition inside a particular society. The quid pro quo of reciprocity 
would lead to a virtuous circle of trust.  
It is very interesting to find out that, during the last two decades, a new group of 
economists have been using laboratory experiments, namely dictator, ultimatum and 
trust games to question the universal validity of the self interested approach to the 
economic realm (Fahr and Irlenbusch, 2000; Berg et al., 1995; Kirchler et al., 1996; 
Bolle, 1998; Burnham et al., 2000). Using data collected in laboratorial settings, they‟ve 
been able to present a more nuanced view of economic agents. In fact, these 
experiments proved the importance of warm glow, trust, reciprocity and amiable 
behaviour and challenged the universal determinism of the homo oeconomicus. The 
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possibility of exchanging good for good and retaliating after being hurt, even when 
retaliation involves forfeiting a gain, only proves the importance of trust in everyday 
life. At the same time, it demonstrates the validity of a homo reciprocans approach to 
the social and economic worlds.  The revamping of the trust concept in sociology was 
also facilitated by Granovetter‟s seminal paper (1985) that has been a cornerstone of the 
New Economic Sociology. In this paper, Granovetter reintroduces trust as a decisive 
dimension of economic action, objecting to its reduction to a simple reputational device. 
Trust is part of his weaponry against both the under and over socialized conceptions of 
human action.   
 Accepting this interactive dimension, we were able to establish a work in 
progress definition of trust; a sensitizing concept we used to shed some light to the 
various dimensions of the phenomenon.   
1. Trust is a social relation established between two independent social agents that 
can exchange roles, pursuing different goals, but that submit each other to an 
interdependence frame that anchors the result of one to the actions of the second. 
The canonical form of trust can be represented as X trusts Y to do Z in the 
context K, under the conditions F1, F2, …, Fn. 
2. Trust is not a leap in the dark or a blind jump of faith. Trust defines limited 
responsibilities and mitigated actions, either by tacit agreements or by formal 
contracts.  
3. Trust works like an „as if‟ social mechanism, simplifying the complex, reducing 
the uncertain, and mitigating risky situations.  
4. There are no societies without trust. However trust can be converted in 
confidence or faith. Dissipation and conversion mechanisms are crucial to the 
understanding of the peculiar types of trust in every society across time and 
space. 
5. Distrust is not the denial of trust but a civilizational mechanism central to the 
modernization process. Distrust has fostered the constitution of decontextualized 
social relations and enabled the build-up of guarantees that are central to the 







3. Political Trust 
 
The concept of trust has been central to the study of political attitudes and opinions at 
least since the works of Almond and Verba (1963), Easton (1965) and Gamson (1968). 
Trust in political institutions and the political system are part of many polls and surveys 
around the world. The standard questions on trust replicated in the World Value Survey 
have even enabled the materialization of many comparative studies. Political trust can 
be defined as an evaluation of government action and effectiveness based upon citizens‟ 
normative expectations of how governments should act. The concept of political trust 
encompasses: the relations between citizens and the polity; attitudes toward the political 
regime; relations with government institutions and agencies, parliaments, and the law.  
This extended definition of trust includes the political system, the political 
regime and the political institutions, but at the cost of violating the interpersonal 
dimension of a general definition of trust. So, it would probably make more sense to 
talk of political confidence when we refer to institutions and governments and limit the 
use of trust to the direct contact between citizens and politicians or civil servants. If we 
accept the idea that trust is mainly an interpersonal relationship than we should focus 
our attention not on the political system or the political institutions but the political 
incumbents in the parliament or in governments. However it remains to be seen if this 
trust in incumbents can be an active cause of electoral trust in countries, like Portugal, 
where the personal vote is not paramount. Anyway, this definition of trust based on the 
assessment of how good the government is acting compared with how good people 
assess its action (Orren, 1997) can contribute to an interesting approach to the study of 
political trust. Instead of seeing it as a one dimensional variable – the direct estimation 
of the quality of the government – trust would be defined as the gap between 
expectations and perceived action (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2001). 
In recent years political trust has been declining on almost all advanced 
industrial societies (Nye et al. 1997; Norris 1999). This has been attributed by many 
(Inglehart, 1977, 1990, 1997; Abramson and Inglehart, 1995; Dalton, 2002) to a value 
shift from materialist to/postmaterialist values, a shift responsible for the creation of a 
new type of political actors prone to challenge authority figures, including the 
government. These authors consider that the economic development and affluence of 
the „glorious‟ 30 years that followed World War II have given rise to a new generation 
of political actors hardly identifiable with the orientations of the older generations. 
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These new actors do not follow the traditional political agendas and are more interested 
in new issues like ecology or minorities rights. Others (Putnam, 1996, 2000) consider 
that the downward trend in political trust is a direct consequence of the crisis in civil 
society. Faithful to a Tocquevillean credo, Putnam considers that the health of the 
political system depends deeply on the energies of the associations and social networks. 
Even if a plethora of studies has disproved the Putnamian isomorphism between social 
and political trust, revealing weak statistical relations between voluntary associational 
involvement and political participation (Kaase, 1999; Newton, 1999, 2001), the impact 
of his ideas has launched a strong debate on the reasons behind the decline of political 
trust and whether this decline constitutes a threat to democracy.  
Democracy and political trust have been following divergent paths in the last 30 
years. The second and third waves of political democratization have been paradoxically 
accompanied by a consistent decline in political trust. Using data from the World 
Values Survey and the European Values Survey, Catterberg and Moreno (2006) 
emphasize that political trust depends partially on government performance, being 
positively related to well-being, social capital, democratic attitudes, political interest, 
and external efficacy, suggesting that trust responds to government performance. But, at 
the same time, political trust is threatened by corruption, political radicalism and 
postmaterialism.  
Many authors (Hetherington, 1998) consider that the erosion of trust, especially 
in democratic societies, contributes to a general climate of „political malaise‟. If we add 
to that the fact that most citizens live in an environment of growing and unmet political 
expectations, it is easy to understand why it becomes more and more difficult for 
politicians to govern, meet public demands and generate trust. However, it is far from 
being proved that this general downward slope of trust in advanced societies is 
something new. A careful look at these trends only demonstrates that we are 
experiencing a mirror image situation of what Durkheim at the end of the XIXth century 
defined as anomie – growing and unmet expectations and aspirations contributed to a 
general state of frustration.  
It is easy to claim that the decline in political trust is strongly correlated with 
increasing levels of electoral abstention, but that is also far from being proved. In fact, 
growing dissatisfaction with democratic government may well lead to a decline in 
electoral turnout (especially in those elections deemed to be less important by citizens) 
and political participation, but it may also assist the rise of voicing and extreme anti-
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government parties (Gamson 1968). Trust is certainly linked with political involvement 
but the particular type of liaison remains, at least, blurry. A close look at the political 
trust literature even suggests a hypothesis of convergence at the extremes, meaning that 
cynicism and sometimes distrust can lead to apathy and withdrawal or more political 
involvement even with abstentionism.  
While distrust may affect electoral participation, leading people to abstention, 
decreasing trust is more associated to the support of third-party alternatives. Some 
authors (Peterson and Wrighton, 1998) go as far as claiming that third parties can act as 
channels of distrust. In a Downsian world of political convergence of the major parties 
at the centre of the political spectrum, third parties can rise as a vehicle of voice for all 
distrustful citizens left without a viable political option and unwilling to travel to the 
„big centre‟. Third parties‟ vote would help to explain part of the ups and downs in 
political trust. In many ways, and contrary to expectations, distrust is not a source of 
apathy or reduced participation, but exactly the opposite. Political mistrust is more 
associated with voice than exit (Citrin and Luks, 2001). 
Trusting someone today may well give us a hint on how a particular subject will 
react tomorrow when facing a similar situation, but her evaluation of the context and her 
expectations will be paramount, making it difficult to easily predict her response. If trust 
was simply a by-product of a general personality trait we would expect high stability in 
the attitudes of people when confronted with the same question across time. But a close 
look at the social barometers and trust inquiries produced all over the world clearly 
show huge variations in very short periods. Even those questions that seemingly reflect 
deeply ingrained feelings cause deep variations, according to the economic situation or 
the political climate. People are simply not immune to the social context. Trusting 
immigrants may elicit very favourable answers in a community which has no direct 
contact with foreigners and very negative answers when their presence becomes salient 
and the contacts problematic or exactly the opposite reaction if the actual contacts prove 
non problematic. Trust is not an absolute proclamation but a contextualized relationship. 
It does not make sense to ask someone if he trusts another – it makes sense to ask him if 







4. The Case Study 
 
Situated in the subject area of the political representations and behaviours of 
populations, this study takes a sociological approach. Its starting point is the empirical 
perception that there are signs of an increasing removal, alienation and distrust with 
respect to the political system, one that is to be observed both in present-day Portugal 
and various other countries.  
From the point of view of political sociology, an attempt was made, more 
particularly, to study an abstaining population that exhibited similar electoral voting 
behaviour to that of the national spectrum but had differences in its socio-urban 
positioning. Research into the electoral results of very recent years led to the 
identification of two cases – two “parishes”
1
 (one urban, in the municipality of Lisbon, 
and the other rural, in the municipality of Alenquer) – with persistently and repeatedly 
high voting abstention levels. In the preliminary survey of the data it was ascertained 
that there were similar characteristics regarding age and low educational levels, fewer 
similar characteristics concerning socio-economic occupations, and not so many for 
professional activities. Two pieces of data (from an administrative source) 
characterising these populations are given below: 
- Registered voters: 1,043 in the urban parish – 1,056 in the rural; 
- Rate of abstention in the elections (2005 General Election): 37 per cent in the urban 
parish – 44 per cent in the rural. 
This sample was later augmented by another, sociographically contrastive, 
population of young people, a population of students from a university institute in 
Lisbon.
2
 They were also abstainers (though naturally „without a past‟) and, apparently, 
removed, alienated and distrustful with regard to the actual dimensions and functions of 
the political system. This attitude can be perceived in their „resistance‟ to adding their 
names to the electoral roll. 
It is now clear that scepticism (escorted by healthy levels of mistrust) is an 
important part of the dynamics of democratic systems (Listhaug and Wiberg, 1995). 
This scepticism reinforces citizenship obligations to exert strict control of the works of 
political institutions. However, studies focused on the links between political trust and 
attitudes in democratic settings reveal that citizens present more than a healthy 
                                               
1 The smallest unit in the portuguese civil and electoral systems. 
2 See Abravanel and Busch (1975) for a pioneering study of political trust among university students. 
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scepticism towards the political system. In fact, there is an undeniable trend leading to 
huge levels of citizen cynicism towards the political world. Value change plays an 
important role on political cynicism leading to a spread of distrust of politicians and 
political institutions. It is also common to claim that young, highly educated citizens 
and libertarians tend to be both more involved and active in political protests and be 
more cynical about political institutions (Lee, 2003). So, the comparison between two 
population sets, clearly different both in terms of average age and in terms of education 
degree, should correspond to a test of a value shift between traditionalism and reliance 
on authority to more libertarian values and self determination. This would also represent 
a deeper social transformation corresponding to the rise of post materialistic values in a 
society that has gone through a fast process of social change over the last 30 years.  
According to some of the relevant academic literature, this distrust tends to have 
overall and mutual repercussions: in effect, it may extend to agents (leading party 
figures and militants, those responsible for public affairs, whether elected or nominated, 
and even journalists and commentators), processes (particularly electoral, though also 
legislative, business, supervisory, judicial and other processes) and political institutions 
(parliament, the government, the public administration, local government, the courts, 
the security and armed forces, etc.). 
 The survey on the ground took place in 2005, with the application of a 
questionnaire based on in-person interviews, and involved 198 validated interviews in 
the rural parish, 128 in the urban parish and 376 among the students. An initial 
sociographic analysis of the results revealed a similar gender distribution in the three 
populations; an inevitably extreme polarisation among the students with regard to age 
(low), studies (more advanced) and occupation (academic); an urban parish population 
notably older than the rural one; marked inactivity in the urban parish; and a significant 
minority of self-employed workers in the rural parish. 
 The results of the survey with regard to electoral choices showed considerable 
voting stability for the two territories in a comparison of the 2002 and 2005 general 
elections, with a dominant PSD (Popular/Social Democratic Party), a weak PS (Socialist 
Party), though with a better result in the rural parish than the urban, and some 
importance in the city parish for the other parties (outside of the alternating government 
system). For the students, the panorama of electoral choices was a little different from 
those observed in the „territories‟. There was a balance between the majority PSD and 
PS parties, a certain disturbance in the „don't know/non-response‟ (DK/NR) replies in 
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2002 and a rise in the „other parties‟ in 2005. Finally, the levels of abstentions and 
spoiled/blank ballots for these three segments of the population remained stable 
throughout this period. On account of the structural similarities already indicated and 
the responses obtained in the survey (more homogeneous than expected), from this 
point we shall present the results of the two territorial populations together, under the 
label of „the parishes‟. 
 
 
5. Political orientations 
 
There is an old tradition in scientific research that consists of analysing not only 
people's electoral behaviour (objectively expressed through the ballot box) but, 
especially, the political attitudes implicit in certain choices or opinions manifested by 
individuals when asked to complete appropriate sociological questionnaires. This has 
been shown in the pioneering studies on political orientations and families by Lavau 
(1952), Duverger (1958), Meynaud (1958) and Lancelot-Meynaud (1962). Normally, 
these attitudes are organised in the form of scales or typologies. The study that inspired 
the present research was carried out in the United States of America and operationalised 
the idea of sounding out the citizens' opinions on a greater or lesser state (government) 
presence in, respectively, economic life and the social behaviour sphere (Pinkerton, 
1996). 
  In our study, the concept of (political) orientation sought to describe the 
individuals' consistent attitudes towards the role of the government in economic and 
social life, with the corresponding operationalisation being carried out on the basis of 
two distinct dimensions. The first was reflected in a question on the best way to 
guarantee the performance of the economic system. The possible alternative responses 
offered included regulation dictated by the state, by market mechanisms or by way of 
the expansion of non-profit institutions (such as cooperatives, associations etc., which 
make up the „third sector‟). The second dimension was reflected in a question on ways 
of disciplining and reconciling the interests (and inherent conflictuality) that exist in 
living together in society: the respondent could choose between an orientation 
recommending stricter application of the law („law & order‟) or, on the contrary, greater 
spontaneous self-regulation with regard to social relationships. 
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 Though the notion of political orientation is still rather imprecise and 
equivocal, it seems difficult to find a better one. It has a rationalising content, when 
„general ideas‟ or „policies‟, with a certain internal coherence or sufficient distinction 
among themselves, are referred to. Its use seems appropriate whenever it involves 
people who possess a certain level of information (particularly about the economy and 
legal/state mechanisms) and objective thinking. But it also contains an ideological 
component, in that the words or linguistic construction used release automatic 
mechanisms of preconceived categorisation, with precise, highly loaded meanings (e.g. 
when the term „market‟ means „capitalism‟ or „exploitation‟ and ipso facto is seen as 
something bad or negative or when „law‟ suggests something imposed from above, 
something external to humanity, and not just a social norm, in legal form, to be applied 
in a certain human context).  
In all cases, the information that we have to deal with in analysing the survey 
results should not be overvalued. What we are attempting to reconstruct and understand 
consists of mere perceptions, captured by means of ill-aimed questions and simple 
obligatory and alternative responses. In other words, it consists of „idealised‟ mental 
representations (referring to ideal types) that can be captured by ordinary people in their 
daily exchanges, in a way that is simplified and only roughly approximate to more 
complete and rigorous definition. This is, however, a technical and communication 
problem that affects all surveys carried out for scientific purposes. But we must 
recognise that it also derives from our methodological inadequacies and the fact that we 
are exploring a conceptual field that is still quite new. In brief: the terms and 
formulations used are still largely exploratory and need to be improved. 
The questions and response alternatives were formulated as follows: 
Q46 – With regard to the regulation of the economy, how could the best results be obtained? 
 1 – With more intervention by the state and public services. 
 2 – With more liberalisation and private enterprise. 
 3 – With more intervention by non-profit agencies. 
Q47 – With regard to issues of conscience and behaviour, how can the quality of life in our society be 
improved? 
 1 – With more intervention and greater strictness on the part of the law and legal system. 
 2 – Less legislation and more liberty/responsibility for individuals themselves. 
 
 Considered in isolation, the responses to these two questions immediately 
showed clear differences between the „parish populations‟ and the „students‟ regarding 
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the economy. The first group inclined towards a greater role for the state and the second 
towards further strengthening of the market, with very weak scores being registered for 
the third sector (even so, they were higher in the parishes). With regard to the regulation 
of life in society, the two samples recorded similar preferences. The DK/NR responses 
were within the expected limits (between 12 per cent and 20 per cent of the total). 
By combining the matrices of those two questions, a typological index was 
constructed using the terms contained in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Typology of political orientations 
Type of orientation: Combinations of opinions: 
Statist More state in the economy and social 
relationships 
Utopian More state in the economy and less in 
society 
Liberal More market in the economy and more 
state in society 
Individualist More market in the economy and less 
state in society 
Societarian More third sector in the economy and 
more state in society 
Libertarian More third sector in the economy and less 
state in society 
 
 Table 2 indicates the distribution frequencies obtained for the index of political 
orientation types.  
Table 2 – Political orientation frequencies by population (%) 
Type of orientation: Parishes: Students: 
Statist 33  13  
Utopian 10  6  
Liberal 15  31  
Individualist 6  18  
Societarian 9  6  
Libertarian 6  2  
DK/NR („Concealed‟) 21  24  




 As can be observed, the respondents' preferences differ greatly. In the parish 
populations, the statists predominate, followed by the liberals, whereas the liberals 
dominate among the students, followed by the individualists and, only at this point, the 
statists. The other types are clear minorities or even very limited in extent. 
 For the following analyses, we decided to give significance to those who could 
not, did not want to or did not know how to choose any one of the response alternatives 
presented to them, the DK/NR group, which we referred to as „concealed‟ – because 
they „shielded‟ themselves from our questions or because, given their complexity, our 
questions „concealed‟ them from themselves. They reached frequencies of over 20 per 
cent, as Table 2 illustrates. 
   
 
6. Some analyses 
 
We present below the results of certain descriptive statistical analyses relating to this 
“political orientation” typology and the two populations selected. There are four types 
of bivariate analyses retained here. 
 In the first place, let us consider the general direction resulting from the cross-
tabulations with sociographical base variables.  
 In the parish populations, we see that the men tend to be more liberal, 
individualist and libertarian, whereas the women appear as more societarian, utopian 
and „concealed‟. This difference is interesting since only the statist type appears to be 
gender-neutral, as it accompanies the general pattern of the sample. Furthermore, as far 
as age is concerned, there are no significant variations according to the different age 
groups considered, with a few small exceptions: there are a few more of the utopians 
among the young, the societarians among the middle-aged and the “concealed” among 
the elderly. 
 With regard to the influence of the variable education – always for the same 
population of the parishes – we can see an increase in the individualists among 
respondents with a middle or higher education, a rise in the liberal, societarian and 
libertarian types among those with the minimum schooling, and a higher number of the 
„concealed‟ among those with no education. 
 Let us now move on to the student population. Here, everything is identical in 
the comparisons between individuals of the two sexes, except for the fact that (though 
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on a very limited scale) there are a few more liberals among the men and a few more of 
the „concealed‟ among the women. 
 We can see, then, that political orientations tend to be more fragmented by the 
condition of birth and the difference in initial socialisation in the “territorialised” 
populations. Among the students they tend to be more homogeneous. 
 In the second place, let us consider the party sympathies shown by the 
respondents. 
 
Table 3 – Party sympathies by population and political orientation (%) 
Type PSD PS Others None Total 
Parishes:      
Statist 14 41 8 37 100 
Utopian 13 35 0 52 100 
Liberal 15  29 4 52 100 
Individualist 9 38 5 48 100 
Societarian 13 27 20 40 100 
Libertarian 16 16 26 42 100 
„Concealed‟ 7 23 2 68 100 
Total 12 32 7 49 100 
Students:      
Statist 24 17 9 50 100 
Utopian 20 15 20 45 100 
Liberal 36 24 12 28 100 
Individualist 23 23 18 36 100 
Societarian 28 24 20 28 100 
Libertarian 0 0 25 75 100 
„Concealed‟ 26 14 12 48 100 
Total 27 20 14 39 100 
 
As we read in Table 3, about half of the parish respondents say they do not 
identify themselves with any party, which also happens with the majority among the 
students, though at a slightly lower level. By type of political orientation, the majority 
among the statists in the territorialised populations prefer the PS; and, for the students, 




 In the third place, we analyse the cross-tabulations of those same variables, this 
time, however, not with the sympathies reported but with the respondents' declared vote 
in the 2005 elections for the Assembly of the Republic (which returned the PS with an 
absolute majority). The numbers can be seen in Table 4. We used the term „removed‟ 
(from the party or political sphere) for all those who stated that they had not voted (by a 
decision taken at the time or because they had not put their names on the electoral roll), 
had cast a spoiled or blank vote or had responded DK/NR.  
 
Table 4 – Voting in the 2005 General Election, by population and political 
orientation (%) 
Type PSD PS Others ‘Removed’ Total 
Parishes:      
Statist 16 56 9 19 100 
Utopian 20 57 0 23 100 
Liberal 25  40 12 23 100 
Individualist 15 55 10 20 100 
Societarian 20 53 17 10 100 
Libertarian 12 29 41 18 100 
„Concealed‟ 15 62 5 18 100 
Total 18 53 10 19 100 
Students:      
Statist 22 35 11 32 100 
Utopian 12 12 47 29 100 
Liberal 39 27 14 20 100 
Individualist 17 30 32 21 100 
Societarian 22 28 28 22 100 
Libertarian 0 25 50 25 100 
„Concealed‟ 28 29 19 24 100 
Total 27 28 22 23 100 
 
 In the parish populations, the vote for the PS was overwhelming and all types of 
political orientation gave it a majority, with the exception of the libertarians, who 
preferred other parties (removed from the field of the alternating government system).   
 With regard to the students, the commentaries can be more highly developed. 
First of all, the votes exhibited a greater spread. Following that, the liberal majority 
supported the PSD; the statists opted above all for the PS, though a fair number of them 
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also took shelter in non-participation; the individualists and societarians were mainly 
divided between the PS and other parties; the highest percentages of utopians and 
libertarians supported “other parties”; and, as could be expected, the majority of the 
„concealed‟ were for non-participation, though those who voted were divided down the 
middle between the PS and PSD. 
 It may be stated, then, that institutional pressure and the utility of participation in 
elections operates, in reality, far beyond party sympathies. In addition, this time the PS 
almost completely dominated the vote of these two populations in the territories, 
whereas among the students there was a much greater division: the majority among the 
liberals (dominant in this population) opted for the PSD, but the PS attracted significant 
shares of the preferences among the statists, the individualists and even the „concealed‟. 
 In the fourth and final place, we also provide brief bivariate analyses, crossing 
the various types of political orientation in both the populations with two successive key 
questions on opinions. The questions relate to their conception of citizenship and the 
trust they place in the prevailing political system. 
 
Table 5 presents the results associated with the question: 
 
 Q.34 - Express your disagreement or agreement with the following statements: 
[…] „Democracy should be the active involvement of citizens in the main political decisions‟ – Response 
„I totally agree‟ […] 
  
Table 5 – Political orientation by „Total agreement […] with the 
involvement of citizens in decisions‟, by population 
(reading the line percentages, in relation to other response alternatives)  
Type of orientation: Parishes: Students: 
Statist 51 % 65 % 
Utopian 48 % 67 % 
Liberal 64 %  59 % 
Individualist 59 % 63 % 
Societarian 54 % 55 % 
Libertarian 35 % 40 % 
“Concealed” 61 % 56 % 




 The different political orientations reflect fairly limited variations in this 
committed conception of citizenship (whereby citizens should participate in the main 
political decisions), in the one population and the other. Thus, there seems to be a 
certain consensus around a demanding idea of democracy, which is more strongly 
affirmed than the idea that democracy consists „of electing leaders who then make 
decisions‟ (which, for example, attracted 50 per cent of the total declarations of 
agreement among the students) or the idea that democracy serves to „protect the citizens 
from political decisions‟ (which obtained 45 per cent of the agreements, under the same 
conditions). 
 It is also worth mentioning that, if we include the fraction of those who „partly 
agree‟ with the statement mentioned (of democracy as the participation of citizens in 
decision-making), then we obtain levels of overall agreement that rise to 87 per cent 
among the „territorialised populations‟ and 95 per cent among the student population. 
 These are clearly values that would appear exaggerated and incongruous if they 
were seen in the light of certain problems relating to the practicability of such a 
principle. But they show the prevalence of a certain idealistic, perhaps mystical, 
conception of democracy as „government by the people‟. 
 Curiously, only the libertarians diverge from this consensus, displaying a 
distinctly lower expectation of what democracy should be, in both populations, possibly 
on account of realistic opinions, lack of faith in the state or a fixation on another 
possible archetype of social life. 
The other key question selected for these cross-tabulations with the different 
types of political orientation was formulated as follows:  
Q.31 – What degree of trust do you place in the state for a solution to the following problems? 
[…] „Corruption and patronage‟ […] – Response „Little trust‟ 









Table 6 – Political orientations by „Little […] trust in the state's ability 
to combat corruption and patronage‟, according to population 
(reading the line percentages, in relation to the other response alternatives)  
Type of orientation: Parishes: Students: 
Statist 42 % 53 % 
Utopian 46 % 50 % 
Liberal 46 %  43 % 
Individualist 23 % 49 % 
Societarian 32 % 43 % 
Libertarian 61 % 67 % 
“Concealed” 53 % 54 % 
Total 44 % 49 % 
 
 Here, general distrust holds the field. The libertarians are clearly more 
suspicious of the state's ability to conquer corruption and patronage than most of the 
others, both in the parish populations and among the students. It can be seen, however, 
that in the „territorialised‟ populations of the parishes surveyed, the societarians and 
especially the individualists are a little less doubtful with respect to that possibility.   
 As above, it can be seen that, if we combine the fraction of those who show „no 
trust‟ with those who expressed the „little trust‟ that we analysed, we attain overall 
levels of distrust of the state's capacity to combat corruption/patronage that reach 77 per 
cent among the parish populations and 89 per cent among students. 
  Finally, it is to be noted that this greater lack of faith on the part of the students, 
as compared to the „territorialised‟ populations, is reflected in practically all the 
different types of political orientation. 
  
 
7. Concluding notes 
 
 In recent years, the distrust, non-participation and alienation of Portuguese citizens 
with regard to the prevailing political system has manifested itself, in particular, in 
electoral abstension and the failure of new voters to add their names to the electoral 
roll. 
 The different ideas held by the population with respect to the state's role in 
economic and social life may form rationalised models of reference to the political 
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system, through the construction of a typology of political orientations; this reflects 
the electoral universe when it is crossed with variables of a sociographical, 
attitudinal and behavioural nature for these populations. 
 An analysis of the responses obtained in a sociological survey of two populations 
with high rates of abstentionism shows that the statist and liberal orientation types 
appear to prevail over the others. However, there remains a significant segment – 
which cannot be ignored – of the „concealed‟, who cannot or do not wish to reveal 
their choices and options to researchers. 
 An analysis of the respondents' sociography, of party sympathies and votes, and of 
the comparison with certain questions on opinions about the political system seems 
to corroborate the conceptual consistency of the types of political orientation 
mentioned above. 
 The research confirms the role of the PS and PSD as polarisers of the supply of 
choice among parties, the alternative function performed by the other parties with 
regard to demand, and the existence of an important element of voters who do not 
find a satisfactory response in the existing range on offer. 
 The interpretation may be drawn that the latter voters, when added to the 
„concealed‟ mentioned above, represent an operational measurement of the degree 
to which citizens distrust the prevailing political system. 
 The empirical base of the population surveys was very limited, though perhaps 
important to and sufficient for this purpose of testing new analytical instruments. 
New empirical research opportunities with a broader investigation base and the use 
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